Join me, please, in celebrating my Slick Silk Sox of A.L. Robinson’s 12^th championship, 16^th year with the league’s best record, and 19^th division title in its 22 year history. By going through the steps I made to build my 2012 team, I hope to provide insights into my strategies (and degree of luck). I’ll even provide a lesson learned for each move. Actually, I should write another essay on all the mistakes I’ve made. That would provide even more lessons.

Some Scoresheet leagues claim to be so competitive that the only way to win a championship is to concentrate all of your talent towards peaking at around the same time, then burn that team down as soon as it slips and rebuild again. Well, that has never been my style and A.L. Robinson is as competitive as any league. Owners in our league do very well in other leagues including some of the most notoriously competitive leagues. Oh, sure, A.L. Robinson was probably just an average league in its early years during the first half of the 1990s, but it has slowly become stronger and stronger. Not only are its long time members more and more experienced, but we have made a concerted effort to replace outgoing members with only demonstrably outstandingly bright baseball minds or proven top notch Scoresheet managers. That said, A.L. Robinson is a private league and a former Canadian Scoresheet League that limits the net number of draft picks traded or acquired. That prevents teams from doing the complete scorched earth rebuilds and outlandish pennant pushes that I’ve heard some teams do.

My team did go through a mini-rebuilding phase. Those three years that I did not win my division came consecutively. They were all second place winning (> .500) teams, but no wild cards. That enabled me to get some mid Round 14 draft picks – two of which worked out decently: Matt Wieters and Adam Jones. The last two years have been 103 win seasons each with accompanying championships – and they could maintain that. They have Mike Trout, Evan Longoria, and no starters over 32. I expect big things from Dylan Bundy soon.

Another difference between the old Canadian leagues and standard U.S. leagues is that we used to disallow acquiring Rule IV June Amateur Draftees until the following winter. I’m not sure what effect that has had. I have been able to draft Trout, Segura, Bundy, and Erlin under the American rules despite never having one of the earlier picks in the supplemental round following the Rule IV June draft.

Here’s my team with the picks & trades that led to them:

Felix Hernandez – R28 in ’04 after one professional season in the low minors – as a 17 year old; Baseball America ranked him #30. John Sickels gave him a B+ and said he “may be the best pitching prospect in baseball a year from now”. Sickels was bang on. King Felix became the number 2 prospect behind only Joe Mauer. That June at the age 19 and 2 months he joined the Mariners’ rotation where he has taken his regular turn ever since. With all those other scouty guys worrying that Hernandez’s pitching motion would send his career to an early grave, I am lucky that I had too much inertia to pass his risk onto someone else.

 

         Lesson: Of course, there is such a thing as a pitching prospect – they’re just a degree more unpredictable.

 

Cliff Lee – R24 in ’08. Lee was a decent starter in ’05 & ’06, then a disaster as a 28 year old in ’07. That year Lee suffered from an abdominal strain, although that did not nearly affect him in 2010. He’s been a pitching ace ever since I drafted him. Cliff Lee has changed real life teams four times since I drafted him. I’m sure glad we don’t have to worry about salaries and free agency in Scoresheet. The two cross-over limit is as close as I want to get to that – and that is just right.

 

         Lesson: Don’t let an injury filled year scare you away, if it is not a career inhibiting injury. Besides that, I was just lucky with Lee. You win some, you lose some.

 

C.J. Wilson – R17 in ’10. An outstanding reliever in ’07 & ’09 with bone spur surgery in-between, the Rangers were giving the 29 year old a shot in the rotation. Wilson had 33 starts his first year in the role, then led the league in starts with 34 these last two seasons. He looked like a Cy Young candidate in the first half of 2012, but struggled in the second half and is having bone spurs removed again.

 

         Lesson: Draft pitchers from the Rangers, Athletics, or Rays. Over the Mike Scioscia years, the Angels have been pretty good, too.

 

James Shields – had to trade Gio Gonzalez and Mike Young for Shields last winter due to x-over overload. Gio was my R15 in ’10 as the 24 year old was just establishing himself in Oakland. I liked his strikeout rate despite only just making it into BA’s top 100. Shields has been up and down, but I’m betting on more consistency from him. Mike Young was tantamount to my 2011 championship as I was able to use him to fill a hole at second with impact hitting. However, I had no room to keep the aging former all-star regular. He cost me Matt Wieters, who was expendable due my having Alex Avila, who was having a far better year last year. Wieters had been my catcher since his call-up in May of 2009. In 2008 before he faced a professional pitcher, he was my highest pick ever R14.5 - after the top three x-overs Miggy, Salty, and J.D., then David Price.

 

         Lesson: Over the years, my pitchers have been consistently around the top of the league. My mantra is: strikeouts, strikeouts, strikeouts.

 

Alex Avila – R18 in ’11. He looked promising after his call-up in 2009 – an overachieving Mike Piazza type with better defense. He batted a very un-Piazza like .656 OPS in 2010. I got lucky with him in 2011 and should have cashed in on his high Batting Average on Balls in Play. Yet, I’m a Detroit Tigers fan and think Alex Avila has the ideal make-up to excel as a Major League catcher. I like having players that I like on a personal basis, so I didn’t have a strong will to unload him after his lucky season. What A.L. catcher is significantly better, anyway? Mauer would drive me crazy with all his injuries, but he keeps coming back and Avila hasn’t exactly been DL free. 2011 was the only year he played more games than Mauer.

 

         Lesson: It is OK to favor those serious live-for-baseball types. They generally do surprisingly well in the long run. Well, perhaps, that is a perception not a lesson, so never mind. The lesson is that BABiP is the greatest new stat since On-Base Average, if you know how to use it.

 

Jesus Montero – R24 in ’09 – from the low minors and no. 38 overall prospect (BA). He’s been in the top 6 ever since. Now that he’s blown his rookie status, I may have to choose between Avila and Montero: overachiever vs. an underachiever, so far, in a pitcher’s park. Gerald Laird was a smart May supplemental pick R38 – just in time for a brief Avila DL stint.

 

         Lesson: April or May are the best months to pick-up your third catcher.

 

Miguel Cabrera – acquired last winter principally for Jose Bautista – my R21 in 2010. As you probably recall, Bautista’s power came to life near the end of 2009. Of course, I didn’t suspect he was on his way to such stardom, but he was having a good spring, so I took a chance that he really did improve. Miggy is two and a half years younger than Joey Bats. At the trade, he had stopped drinking and would remain a corner infielder where I needed someone, while Bautista was getting moved permanently to the outfield. I had to include Billy Butler and Lorenzo Cain, but got back two picks R16 & R38 – both of which ended up busts (Johnny Giavotella and Xavier Avery), while Butler had a very nice year. I’m not complaining.

 

         Lesson: Sometimes those hot streaks are real improvements. Look for a stable BABiP and some work with a successful hitting coach.

 

For accounting purposes at the end of this essay, I should credit Butler for, perhaps, 2 of Cabrera’s 10 value points. In that case, Butler goes back to a pre-2008 trade that came with Fausto Carmona (now known as Roberto Hernandez) for Mark Teixeira. There’s a bad trade, although, I’d say Butler is finally the better player from 2012 on. Teixeira came in a pre-2003 exchange for Jason Giambi. I landed Giambi in one of my better trades for Rusty Greer before the 1999 season. Greer was my R16 in 1996, who had a nice rookie ¾ season in 1994, then sophomore slumped to just average hitting in 1995. From ’96 to ’99 his age 27-30 seasons, he was a regular .315/.400/.500 OBP guy.

 

Aaron Hill – acquired a month into the 2011 for Doug Jennings. Hill had just turned 30, but I liked him more than Kelly Johnson (same age) who I could have had instead. It’s not that I have more faith in the Diamondbacks’ Ken Towers over the Blue Jays’ Alex Anthropolis – perhaps, the opposite. I just couldn’t ignore how well Hill had been doing since he was traded to Arizona (with John McDonald for Kelly Johnson). Sometimes a new hitting coach, a new manager, etc. can bring the best out of a struggling player. Jennings was a prospect I picked up during that brief rebuilding phase I went through – when I traded Jorge Posada at the 2007 deadline. Posada was having a monster season while turning 36. He had been my catcher since late 1998 when I made a two-for-one trade to lock him up during his first year as the Yankees’ primary catcher. One of those two Don Wilson was the catcher I was upgrading from – an R15 in ’96. The other was the original Roberto Hernandez - my closer the previous four years – last drafted R18 in ’96. He was having an off year in ’98 after having two awesome years in ‘96 & ’97. I drafted two secondbasemen in R16 of 2012. One Giavotella couldn’t keep his job over Chris Getz of the Royals and the other Gordon Beckham was just horrible this April. However, he did re-coop well enough to make a nice back-up.

 

         Lesson: It seems to me Scoresheet players should love trades, so I am hoping you found the chain of trades that led to Aaron Hill and Billy Butler interesting. It was part of my baseball upbringing. I can tell you from memory the chain of trades that led from the Tigers’ shortstop of the 1950s to their shortstop in 1970: Harvey Kuenn for Rocky Colavito (the famous batting champ traded for the home run champ) for Dave Wickersham for Dennis Ribant for Don McMahon for Cesar Gutierrez.

 

Alcides Escobar and Alexei Ramirez – I took a shot on Alexei in 2008 and later traded him for Coco Crisp, then got him back before the 2010 season for Brandon Morrow, who was my R18 in 2008. Ramirez was drafted R26 that year. Ramirez gave way to Escobar this year, who I drafted R19.

 

         Lesson 1: Look at that Morrow/Ramirez trade. Don’t hang onto guys just because you previously overvalued them. It is natural to think, “I paid dearly for him, I’m not going to give him up for something so much less”. But, you have to fight that ill logic. It seems even Major League teams fall into that trap. It is better to sink those costs. However, don’t swing too wildly with your evaluations of healthy veterans, but constantly update you evaluations of players coming into the Majors.

 

         Lesson 2: I drafted three middle infielders in rounds 16 to 19 this year. The first one (Giavotella) was a complete waste. The second (Beckham) was barely adequate. The third (Escobar) was surprisingly good. That is about all what you should expect from three moderately high picks.

 

Even Longoria – A third overall pick in real baseball, Longoria quickly powered his way up to AA as a 20 year old. Baseball America ranked him the 7^th best prospect in the world. He became eligible to A.L. Robinson owners that February of 2007 and I drafted him in R16. Daisuke and Abreu were the top newcomers to the A.L. that winter. Adam Loewen, who mastered all levels of minor league pitching, but struggled to the extent of a 5.37 ERA in 112 rookies innings with Baltimore was snatched up third overall. I took Andrew Miller with my first pick – he was BA’s no. 10 guy, but like Loewen – already getting a taste of the bitter Majors. The unexciting but often necessary Kevin Millwood was my R15. It seems it was just one of those lucky drafts that Longoria was still available on the third/(officially 16^th) round. Longoria became my regular thirdbaseman a season and a quarter later after Tampa Bay delayed the start of his Major League service clock as long as they could.

 

         Lesson: Obviously position prospects are more reliable than pitching prospects – and I’ve already alluded to that in a previous lesson, so I will go with: count on Tampa Bay bringing up their top level prospects a little later than most teams. This isn’t necessarily a bad thing for Scoresheet GMs as it means generally that player won’t have a year of struggles while losing their prospect eligibility as often as most prospects. That is especially good for strong teams that wish to perpetuate their contending years.

 

Edwin Encarnacion – Longoria got hurt early in the year (2012) and I was playing a shortstop Alcides Escobar at third base in his place. That was because my back-up first-baseman Mike Carp also got hurt, so it was no help to move Miguel Cabrera over the diamond. My team had the best pitching in the league, but my hitting was middle of the pack at that point. The opposite would be true in the second half. My hitting took off when I acquired EE. (At the same time Mike Trout blossomed into a superstar, I drafted Brandon Moss, and Jesus Montero started to hit. Oh, well.) The trade was made around the start of July, so Encarnacion only shown a half season of impact (.950 OPS) hitting after 6 full seasons of just average hitting. I decided the improvement was real anyway. He cost me my ace lefty reliever Jake McGee (I had two others: Darren Oliver and Jose Mijares) and two prospects: Robert Erlin and Jean Segura. McGee himself was protected as a prospect having finished 2011 just under the career inning limits. He was my R28 in 2010. Segura was an R23 in 2011, while Erlin was my 2^nd to last pick in August of 2011 (R43).

 

Lesson: The obvious one here is a repeat of the Bautista lesson, so instead I will point out that probably the most significant thing you can do to make yourself a successful Scoresheet manager is to be relentless at looking for ways to make sure your team is as good as it can be. I’m not talking about finding the perfect metric to gauge future performance; I’m just talking more about doing everything you can with what you already know to find a way to improve your team. The easiest way to do that is to determine your biggest hole and (without creating another hole, of course) keep looking for ways to fix it until it is fixed. You all know you should do that, but do you think about when you are showering or walking to work? Is it your primary daydream? I have no other life.

 

Curtis Granderson – the third long-lasting addition to my regulars in 2008 after King Felix and Longo was Granderson. This was driven by an injury to Vernon Wells more than a love of Grandy – although I do have strong admiration for him as a person (and at the time: a Tiger). I gave up my much coveted corner outfielder Nick Markakis to get him. Markakis came to me before 2007 with Troy Glaus for Manny Ramirez and David DeJesus. Manny was considered the top prize of the deal, but Markakis and Glaus were the 2^nd and 3^rd most valued players of that deal. Markakis just turned 23 with his rookie season of .799 OPS behind him. Manny was 34 ½ with a 1.058 OPS and had played his entire Scoresheet career for me up to that time. Despite the fact that Manny had destroyed both AA and AAA in 1993 while turning 21, I was able to draft him in 1994 with the last pick of the second round R15. In those days, we were only allowed to keep two prospects. Most of the managers had far more shallow baseball knowledge than our managers now and the prospect craze was nothing like what it has grown to.

 

Lesson: Don’t you hate it when another manager’s interest in one of your players makes you want to keep him even more? I do, but it is understandable and prudent – and I’d be hypocritical to be critical of that practice (which I have been). I was almost ready to let go of Granderson after two sub all-star calibre seasons in ’09 and ’10 – especially since in 2010, he traded his navy Old English “D” on white for a black Old English “NY” on pinstripes. However, one manager – my division rival - inquired about him and enlightened me to the fact that he had a great September after an adjustment to his swing – just as Jose Bautista had the year before. Hmm. I think I’ll keep him, thanks.

 

Adam Jones – I originally drafted Jones in 2006, then traded him for some pitching in a late season pennant push. After 203 Major League games with two organizations and with only a .711 OPS to show for it, his manager – a friend who found Scoresheet required more expertise than he had time to give, let him go. Jones was only 22. Well, perhaps, that’s not outrageous, but I was certainly happy to scoop him back into my fold with my first (R14) pick of 2009.

 

Lesson: Have the right amount patience with young highly touted position players. If a player shows no sign of improvement – not even an minor injury camouflaging his improvements, then unload him. However, Jones has improved slightly every year. This year (2012) he finally took a big step until an injury brought his stats closer to previous norms.

 

Mike Trout – How’s that for the very last player taken (R44) in 2009? At that point he was the 25^th overall pick from the June draft a couple months earlier and had killed two levels of Rookie League ball. Kevin Goldstein gave me the heads up on Trout through Baseball Prospectus.

 

Lesson: Well, Goldstein was hired by the Astros, but BPro is trying to keep up what he was doing and then some. Despite the profound personal pain due to their editor Joe Hamrahi never answering my e-mails, I must honestly recommend subscribing. If not, there may be other prospect pickers who could keep you abreast. Or, just check on all the available no. 1 June draft picks each August and take a chance with your own common sense. Trout – a 17-turning-18 year old centerfielder with 26 stolen bases and 4 caught stealing hitting over .900 at two different levels of professional baseball. You have the last pick. Who needs a scouting report?

 

Brandon Moss and Rajai Davis – Not only were Longoria and Carp hurt, my top substitute outfielder Nolan Reimold was out indefinitely as well. They guy I drafted in May to replace Reimold (Xavier Avery) was sent down the next week. So, instead of trying to snag the next superstar from the 2012 June draft – which apparently was a weak draft, I shored up my bench with outfielders Davis (R40) and Moss (R41). They were a good pair, in that Davis is good defensively and bats righty, while Moss bats lefty, can play firstbase, and mashed AAA. Davis has the added bonus of playing for my local team (Toronto) and being the best position player currently in the American League from my home state (Connecticut). (No, Toronto is not in CT, I grew up there, but have lived my entire post-bachelorhood in Ontario.) Moss continued to mash the American League. If I knew he was going to be that good, I wouldn’t needed Encarnacion. I could have played Moss at first and moved Miggy to third. Moss ended up with only 75 at bats for me.

 

Lesson: How well a player does in real life is not a complete reflection on his value to you. A great season only helps if you see it coming and make room for it in your line-up.

 

Dave Robertson, Mike Adams, Greg Holland, & Kelvin Herrera – I protected Robertson after drafting him R18 in 2011 – same round which netted Alex Avila. Technically, the Robertson pick was payment for Ben Zobrist – a player I had mistakenly determined that I could not protect. However, I couldn’t whip up any interest in Delmon Young who I kept instead. In 2010 Young had his best year so far. Zobrist had by far his worse since he became a regular. Sadly I traded Asdrubal Cabrera for him the winter before.

 

In 2007, we had just two supplemental drafts of four players each. Asdrubal Cabrera was taken with my second pick (R41) in that July draft. At that point he was a 21 year old still in AA or, perhaps, recently promoted to AAA. I have to confess I am having trouble remembering why I drafted him so enthusiastically. He was called up to the Indians in early August and earned a starting job. Perhaps, BPro’s Goldstein alerted me to his hotness and I may have brrn counting on his being a full timer in 2008 for the price of a rookie slot. He earned his keep ever since and took a big step up in value in 2011. Yeah, I fumbled him, but, at least, I have Dave Robertson to show for him.

 

Lesson 1: Just as it is good to know when a player is really improved or just having a career year or month, etc., it is good to know when a player is just having an off year or two, etc. or is permanently in decline. Zobrist did have a low BABiP in 2010, but not so low as to explain the offness of that season. He hit much worse the 2^nd half of the season as his slightly disappointing first half, so that gave us no clues. Frankly, I’m not sure what the lesson is other than we shouldn’t give up on a position player still in his late twenties unless his decline has been fairly steady for several years.

 

With a few extra picks, I was able to afford loading up on top notch relievers. Adequate, but slightly disappointing Mike Adams came R15. A complete bust Sergio Santos came R17. I couldn’t resist drafting Greg Holland at the bargain price of R21. Then, I took my best reliever (if I had only known to use him as such) Kelvin Herrera at R28. Despite the injury to Santos, that is a pretty darn good return on the relievers I drafted – which was equally good with the lefties I picked.

 

Lesson 2: Relievers are not as unpredictable as you may think. I try to keep my Strategies pages up to date, if you want to try my methods.

 

Jake McGee, Darren Oliver, Jose Mijares – If you have read everything, so far, you might remember McGee was part of the Sept. ’07 Jorge Posada package that brought Desmond Jennings (who brought me Aaron Hill). And you might remember that I traded McGee in the mid season 2012 package for Edwin Encarnacion. Well, I got him back when Oliver and Mijares were having bad months and I was gearing up for the post season. I got back Robbie Erlin portion of the EE trade, too, but not Jean Segura – although, I did get my trade partner’s R44 thrown in – all for Matt Garza.

 

Both Oliver and Mijares recovered to have nice Septembers, so the trade was probably not worthwhile. Lefties are a bit more expensive than right-handers. I took Oliver on R24. I traded my R39 for an extra R41 – and a higher draft slot and picked up Mijares then.

 

Lesson: Trading injured players is an effective way to acquire talent for a play-off run. All except the elite prospects are just trading chips used like draft picks to even out trades.

 

Matt Garza, Colby Lewis, Tommy Milone, Felipe Paulino – I have never had so many plausibly all-star calibre relievers at once: EIGHT of them! It is very rare to have 8 starters who are both healthy and pitching in the Majors, let alone all having below average ERAs. My fortune didn’t last long. By the end of July, Garza, Lewis, and Paulino were gone for the season and the league started to catch up with Milone. So, I hardly used Lewis or Paulino at all, and my team got the worse of Milone. (C.J. Wilson pitched the second half with a bone spur, while Felix Hernandez imploded in September – but, please, do not feel sorry for me.) Garza was my first pick in the July supplemental draft of 2006 (R40) – as he had already shot up three levels that summer and was dominating AAA. He later pitched 50 innings for Minnesota breaking his prospect eligibility. He didn’t return to the Twins rotation until mid season the next year, but was consistently good and healthy for the next five seasons. I was shocked Colby Lewis was left unprotected last winter and immediately snatched him up (R14) tossing my well planned draft strategies in the recycling bin. Milone came into my fold R18 and I took a flyer on Paulino at R23.

 

Lesson: You’ve heard the saying, “you can never have too much pitching”, but that’s too easy. Um, I’ve already mentioned how you should play favorites with the Rangers and the Athletics. I don’t play N.L. Scoresheet, but it appears obvious that the main reason the Giants and Cardinals are where they are now (fighting each other for the N.L. championship), is because they are even better at getting the best out of their pitchers. No, I’m going with: don’t underrate those late season supplemental picks. Neither Garza, Trout, nor Asdrubal were on the top 100 prospect lists the winter before they had their break out seasons.

 

Phil Coke, George Kontos, Alfredo Simon – these three fine relievers were of particular value because they could come in before the fourth inning. Coke was my R25 – and served as my early lefty – especially after I needed Milone for the rotation. I took Kontos in July (R42) after Lewis and Paulino went down. I took Justin Germano R43, but he stunk. Kontos has the added benefit of not blowing his rookie status, so I can keep him for next year. I had to take Simon (R44) and waste my R45 on Troy Patten in August after Garza was gone.

 

Lesson: Here again you can see the added importance of supplemental picks to fill in for injuries. And don’t forget those rookie relievers who are called up in June or later and won’t make it to the 50 inning mark. Although, I just have Kontos this winter, I had McGee and Yoshinori Tateyama last year. Although, I had to protect him, Tateyama garnered an extra pick for me in R28 (Eddie Rosario).

 

Dylan Bundy, Eddie Rosario, Taylor Lindsay, Xavier Avery – the first guy is an elite prospect. The rest are trading chips – at best, although certainly the two infielders could grow into something terrific, I wouldn’t hesitate to spend them, if needed. Bundy, then, is the one worth discussing. I drafted him in the first round (R39) after the June 2011 draft, but not until the 9^th player overall that month. I even drafted a player – Jim Johnson - ahead of him - not unreasonably - as were Jemile Weeks, Bubba Starling, Danny Hultzen, Phillip Humber, Leonys Martin, Casey Kotchman, and Tim Beckham. This was an historically strong draft. Jurickson Profar was taken with the next pick and Francisco Lindor was taken in the middle of the next round. We didn’t have much to go on other than the glowing reports and mock drafts. I had Bundy at the top of my list among the prospects.

 

Note that the 39^th pick of the 2009-2011 supplemental drafts corresponds to R40 of the pre 2009 drafts and post 2011 drafts. That is the first round after the June draft. Before 2009, R43 was the last pick. Since 2012, R45 is the last pick.

 

Lesson: Pay close attention to those June draft reviews – not just go by draft order: why one team wants one player over another – is there is just a signing issue or a rouge team philosophy on player acquisitions? How strong is the consensus? Is the draft class a strong one or not? I didn’t draft anyone this year, although Brian Buxton, for example, was on my list. I don’t remember if I listed him higher than Davis and Moss or not.

 

Using my team as an ridiculously small sample, let’s tally what picks my talent came from – going back to the players I traded to get them. If I traded multiple players – those points are divided amongst them. Let’s count most of the useful relievers and bench guys as 1 point. Give Paulino a point, too. Robertson, Moss, Montero, and Lewis get 2 points, because I said so, and I’m giving Avila and the two shortstops three points. Encarnacion, Hill, Garza and Wilson get four points. I think Dylan Bundy could easily fetch a four point player right now, so he gets four, too. Shields, Granderson, and Adam Jones are in the five echelon. Longoria, Cliff Lee, and Felix H. are eights. Miggy and Trout are tens.

 

Before I leave you with the distribution of talent by draft picks used in its procurement, let me tell you what percentage of the players worth four points or higher were either taken as prospects or bought with players taken as prospects: 54% or 7 of 13. There is no heavy distribution of those players towards the stronger end either. Every other name going by the list of players in the paragraph above I either drafted as a prospect or traded for with players I drafted as prospects if you go back to the start of their trade chain:  EE, but ultimately not Hill; Garza, but not C.J.; Bundy, not Shields; Grandy, not Adam Jones; Longo, not Cliff Lee; King Felix, not Miggy; and, yes, Trout.

 

Keep in mind my R14s are not typical R14s. They have been generally towards the end of the first round. Anyone with early first round picks – especially a first overall pick – would likely have more points there. Remember, this is a small sample size, so you should, at least, blur the numbers to make a smooth curve. But, here’s something interesting: notice the big jumps at R21 and R28? Our league had been drafting in three stages: R14-R20 in mid February, R21-R27 in early March, R28-R35 in late March. That extra time to ponder our next picks and get more intelligence on players’ health apparently increases our chance of making a wise choice at the start of each new phase.